KEYNOTE ADDRESSES
ASSESSING CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAM REHNQUIST
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY

†

How should a Chief Justice be assessed? This conference provides
the occasion for considering this question as part of looking at the
role of Chief Justice on the Supreme Court and in the American legal
system. Rather than examining the office generally, I want to focus on
assessing William Rehnquist as Chief Justice. One way of assessing any
Chief Justice is in terms of her ability to achieve a substantive vision of
the law. In this sense, few would disagree that John Marshall and Earl
Warren were enormously successful in having their substantive visions
reflected in the decisions of their Courts. Marshall’s visions of judicial
review and federalism, among other crucial issues, were embodied in
1
2
decisions like Marbury v. Madison and McCulloch v. Maryland, which
provided a framework for government that lasts to this day. Earl Warren’s visions of a more equal society better protecting the dignity of
3
individuals were reflected in the desegregation cases, the rulings in4
corporating the Bill of Rights, and the decisions requiring reappor5
tionment of state legislatures. Writings on the Warren Court, both by
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Alston & Bird Professor of Law and Political Science, Duke University.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (providing that the Supreme Court can review and invalidate laws that are unconstitutional).
2
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436-37 (1819) (establishing that states cannot tax an “instrument employed by the government of the Union to carry its powers into execution”).
3
See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (holding that segregating students based on race deprived children of educational opportunities and was
therefore illegal).
4
See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968) (incorporating the
Sixth Amendment trial-by-jury right to apply in all criminal cases, including those at
the state level); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (concluding that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a fundamental right that applies to states); Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule applies to state searches as well as federal searches).
5
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (articulating the requirement
for “one person, one vote” in drawing election districts).
1
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historians and other Justices, leave no doubt as to the profound effect
6
of Earl Warren in bringing about these results.
How should William Rehnquist be assessed as Chief Justice? More
specifically, to what extent did the decisions of the Rehnquist Court
reflect the views of its Chief Justice? That is the focus of this Article.
At the outset, I need to admit to all of the problems in even engaging in this inquiry. First, it is problematic to assess history that is so
recent. The last Term of the Rehnquist Court ended on June 27,
2005, and an academic conference in November 2005 provides only
the chance for immediate reflections on an era that has just ended.
Certainly, one measure of effectiveness is in bringing about enduring
changes in the law. At this point, there can be nothing except guesses
and speculation as to which aspects of the Rehnquist Court’s decisions
will survive and provide a framework for future rulings and which will
7
be overruled or relegated to constitutional footnotes.
Second, focusing on the Court’s decisions does not assess all of
the other ways in which a Chief Justice influences the Court and the
judicial system. For example, a key role of the Chief is in the operation of the Supreme Court, including its efficiency and its collegiality.
From everything that is known so far, William Rehnquist likely will be
8
regarded as an excellent Chief in these tasks. One of the most important developments during the time Rehnquist was Chief Justice was
a dramatic decrease in the size of the Supreme Court’s docket. The
Court handed down 164 written opinions in Rehnquist’s first year as
6

See WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939-1975: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 114-15 (1980) (discussing Warren’s influence on the Court
in deciding Brown); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 682-86 (1977)
(providing a historical account of how Warren helped to unite the Supreme Court in
Brown).
7
There already are several excellent books on the Rehnquist Court and the impact of its decisions. See, e.g., MARTIN GARBUS, COURTING DISASTER: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE UNMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 1 (2002) (noting that the Rehnquist
court has radically changed American law); MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE
REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 9-10 (2005) (listing the
implications of the Supreme Court’s decisions on different social and political issues);
Martin H. Belsky, The Rehnquist Court: A Review at the End of the Millennium, in THE
REHNQUIST COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE 3 (Martin H. Belsky ed., 2002) (“Chief Justice
Rehnquist has been able to witness and even shape a dramatic change in constitutional
jurisprudence . . . .”).
8
His predecessor, Warren Burger, has been much criticized in these regards. See,
e.g., BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT 174 (1979) (discussing Burger’s problems in administering the Supreme Court
and noting that he spread himself too thin with non-Court business).
OF
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an Associate Justice, but only seventy-nine opinions in his last Term.
I doubt that anyone would deny that this reflects Rehnquist’s influ11
ence.
The Chief Justice also is responsible for overseeing the Judicial
Conference of the United States, the important rules committees, and
other aspects of the federal judiciary, including making appointments
to some specialized courts and committees. Although all of this is important, none of it is my focus.
Third, it must be recognized that the success, or lack of it, in implementing a substantive vision may have nothing to do with the Chief
Justice’s effectiveness. Imagine that Michael Dukakis had won the
1988 presidential election and had appointed the successors to William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall. Without Clarence Thomas as
a fifth vote in so many cases, countless decisions implementing
12
Rehnquist’s views almost surely would have come out differently.
Rehnquist likely would have been far less successful substantively, but
not because of anything to do with his skills or effectiveness.
Fourth, the quantity of cases makes overall assessments inherently
questionable. Rehnquist served as Chief Justice from 1986 to 2005.
Over those nineteen Terms, the Supreme Court decided thousands of
cases. It is possible to find examples to support any conclusion. Care
must be taken to avoid “law-office history”—picking cases from the
13
historical record to support preconceived conclusions.

9

The Supreme Court, 1972 Term: The Statistics, 87 HARV. L. REV. 303, 303 tbl.1a
(1973).
10
The Supreme Court, 2004 Term: The Statistics, 119 HARV. L. REV. 415, 420 tbl.1a
(2005).
11
Whether this reduction is desirable, of course, is a different question and one
beyond the scope of this Article.
12
See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (per curiam) (resolving the 2000
presidential election by reversing the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida); Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (upholding the ability of the Boy
Scouts to exclude homosexuals on freedom of association grounds); Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (limiting Congress’s power to authorize suits against
state governments); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (declaring unconstitutional a federal statute for exceeding the scope of Congress’s Commerce
Clause authority).
13
See Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV.
119, 122 n.13 (speaking of “law-office history” and its dangers when examining a historical record).
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14

Although I admit to all of these problems, I still believe it is
worth offering an initial assessment of William Rehnquist’s substantive
success as Chief Justice. My overall conclusion is that Rehnquist was
enormously successful in that the Supreme Court during his tenure
accepted his views in almost every area of law. In some high profile
areas, the Court did not go as far as Rehnquist wanted. The Court did
not overrule abortion rights, but it did abandon the use of strict scrutiny and provided more deference to government regulation of abor15
16
tions. The Court did not eliminate all affirmative action, but it did
adopt strict scrutiny as the test for racial classifications benefiting mi17
norities. The Rehnquist Court did not overrule the test for the Es18
tablishment Clause put forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, but it did allow
19
much more government aid to parochial schools.
In explaining my assessment of the Rehnquist Court, this Article is
divided into two parts. Part I argues that it is a mistake to think of the
Rehnquist Court as if it were the same throughout the tenure of the
Chief Justice. Rather, I believe that there were three distinct phases of
the Rehnquist Court and that Rehnquist’s success in achieving his
substantive vision varied over time. Part II then looks at the specific
areas of constitutional law and suggests that in every major area,

14

Yet another problem is in determining the vision of the Chief Justice. Although
a Chief Justice’s views can be determined from her opinions, there is no way to know
the priorities that a Chief Justice placed on the various areas of law.
15
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878-79 (1992) (allowing legislation mandating waiting periods for abortions that previously had been invalidated in City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 426 (1983)).
16
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (allowing colleges and universities to use race as one factor in admissions decisions to benefit minorities and enhance diversity).
17
See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding
that any racial classifications by federal or local actors must be given strict scrutiny);
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (upholding strict
scrutiny for racial classifications even when the classifications benefit minorities).
18
403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (stating that a statute “must have a secular legislative purpose,” that its “primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion” and that it does not “foster an excessive government entanglement with religion” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
19
See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002) (approving an
Ohio program that provides assistance to children in “failed school district[s]” to attend any other school in the area, including religious schools); Mitchell v. Helms, 530
U.S. 793, 829 (2000) (“[N]othing in the Establishment Clause requires the exclusion
of pervasively sectarian schools from otherwise permissible aid programs . . . .”);
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 208 (1997) (allowing public school teachers to go to
“parochial schools to provide remedial education to disadvantaged children”).

2006]

ASSESSING CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAM REHNQUIST

1335

Rehnquist was very successful in that the Court adopted and reflected
his views and visions.
This Article is meant to be descriptive, not normative. My goal is
to describe the Rehnquist Court and assess the extent to which its decisions reflected the substantive values of its Chief Justice. Although
my descriptions are undoubtedly influenced by my quite different
normative vision, I do not seek to evaluate or criticize the desirability
of the Rehnquist Court’s decisions and doctrines. Quite the contrary,
my hope is that both liberals and conservatives will agree with the descriptions I provide below of the Rehnquist Court and my assessment
of the substantive success of William Rehnquist as Chief Justice.
I. THE ERAS OF THE REHNQUIST COURT
It is tempting to speak of the Rehnquist Court as if it were a single
entity and the same throughout the tenure of William Rehnquist as
Chief Justice. In an obvious way, this is incorrect because the Court’s
membership changed over Rehnquist’s nineteen years as Chief Justice. In 1987, Lewis Powell was replaced by Anthony Kennedy. In
1990, William Brennan was replaced by David Souter. In 1991, Thurgood Marshall was replaced by Clarence Thomas. In 1993, Byron
White was replaced by Ruth Bader Ginsburg. In 1994, Harry Blackmun was replaced by Stephen Breyer. In other words, five of the
other eight Justices were replaced during Rehnquist’s time as Chief
Justice. Or put another way, only three Justices—John Paul Stevens,
Sandra Day O’Connor, and Antonin Scalia—were present for all of
the Rehnquist Court. Interestingly, all of the changes in personnel
occurred in the first eight years of the Rehnquist Court; there were no
vacancies during the last eleven years.
Professor Thomas W. Merrill suggested that there were two
Rehnquist Courts: one from October 1986 until July 1994, and one
20
after that time period.
Professor Merrill suggested, among other
conclusions, that in its second phase, the Rehnquist Court was “increasingly dominated by a single bloc of five Justices” and that
“[s]ocial issues like abortion, affirmative action, and school prayer
21
have significantly receded from the scene.” Although I think that
Professor Merrill’s analysis can be criticized for giving too little atten-

20

Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 569-70 (2003).
21
Id. at 570.
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tion to cases that were inconsistent with his thesis, developments
since his article undermine his view that there were just two eras of
the Rehnquist Court. Between 2002, the last Term that Professor
Merrill considered, and the end of June 2005, the Court very much
turned to the social agenda which Professor Merrill saw the Court as
eschewing. Subsequent to Professor Merrill’s article, the Court up23
held affirmative action in colleges and universities, invalidated laws
24
criminalizing private consensual homosexual activity, struck down a
25
federal law regulating child pornography, and found a Ten Com26
mandments display on government property to be unconstitutional.
By any measure, including Professor Merrill’s own definition, these
are “social issues,” and they by no means retreated from the scene
during the last years of the Rehnquist Court.
Moreover, the five-Justice bloc that Professor Merrill identified was
much less cohesive during the last years of the Rehnquist Court. For
example, of the seventy-six decisions in October Term 2004, nineteen
were decided by a five-to-four margin, and in only four of these closely
divided decisions was the majority comprised of Rehnquist,
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Thus, while I agree very
much with Professor Merrill’s premise that the Rehnquist Court
changed over time, I see the phases of the Rehnquist Court quite differently from Professor Merrill’s description. I believe that there were
three distinct phases of the Rehnquist Court since William Rehnquist

22

See Erwin Chemerinsky, Understanding the Rehnquist Court: An Admiring Reply to
Professor Merrill, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 659, 670-74 (2003) (arguing that the second
Rehnquist Court addressed the same number of cases, or more, involving social issues
as compared to the first Rehnquist Court).
23
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (“The Equal Protection
Clause does not prohibit the Law School’s narrowly tailored use of race in admissions
decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that
flow from a diverse student body.”).
24
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (stating that a Texas statute
criminalizing private, consensual homosexual conduct is not furthered by a legitimate
state interest).
25
See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 257-58 (2002) (holding that the
prohibitions against material appearing to be child pornography or promoted as child
pornography are overbroad and unconstitutional).
26
See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2738-41 (2005) (finding
that the posting of the Ten Commandments in government buildings for the purpose
of advancing religion violates the Establishment Clause). But on the same day the
Court upheld another Ten Commandments display. See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct.
2854, 2858-59 (2005) (holding that a six-foot-high, three-foot-wide Ten Commandments monument between the Texas State Capitol and the Texas Supreme Court does
not violate the Establishment Clause).
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was elevated to Chief Justice in 1986. The first phase, from 1986 to
about 1992, was characterized by great deference to the elected
branches of government. Rarely during this time did the Court in27
validate federal, state, or local laws, and the Court frequently proclaimed the need for great judicial deference to the elected branches
28
of government.
To select one Term as an example, October Term 1988 was
marked by an exceptional number of significant rulings, such as nar29
30
rowing abortion rights, limiting affirmative action, striking down
31
laws prohibiting flag burning, and curtailing the availability of ha32
beas corpus. It also was an important Term in that it was the first full
year on the Court for Anthony Kennedy, who often joined with
Rehnquist, White, O’Connor, and Scalia, providing the fifth vote for
conservative five-to-four decisions. In describing that Term soon after
its completion, I wrote:
The Court’s desire to avoid judicial value impositions combined with
its commitment to deferring to majoritarian decisionmaking produces a
sweeping judicial deference. The Court’s inability to develop a theory of
interpretation consistent with its premises—a theory for when it should
accept constitutional claims and hold against the government—leaves
the Court in a very deferential posture.
Thus, one obvious consequence of the Court’s jurisprudence is that
33
the government generally wins constitutional cases.

Statistics from October Term 1988 supported this conclusion of a
highly deferential Court, and especially that the conservative Justices
were particularly loathe to strike down actions taken by the elected
branches of government.
27

See Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV.
43, 56-59 (1989) (describing judicial deference during October Term 1988).
28
See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131-32 (1989) (upholding a state
law that denied unmarried fathers all parental rights based on deference to a legislative policy of maintaining the integrity of the marital union).
29
See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 518, 532 (1989) (upholding
Missouri’s regulation of abortions with four Justices strongly indicating a desire to
overrule Roe v. Wade).
30
See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507-08 (1989) (invalidating a city’s set-aside of thirty percent of its public works’ money for contracts with minority-owned businesses).
31
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (invalidating a state law prohibiting flag burning).
32
See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989) (holding that a habeas petition
may rely on a new rule of constitutional law only if it is applied retroactively).
33
Chemerinsky, supra note 27, at 56-57.
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For example, in forty-seven non-unanimous decisions in constitutional
cases during the 1988[] Term, Chief Justice Rehnquist voted against the
government only twice. Similarly, in non-unanimous cases, Justice Kennedy voted against the government only five times. The government
prevailed in seventy-nine percent of the non-unanimous decisions in
34
constitutional cases before the Supreme Court [that] Term.

If all constitutional decisions, both unanimous and nonunanimous, are examined, “the government won sixty-six percent of the
35
constitutional cases [in the 1988] Term.” By contrast, twenty years
earlier, in the 1968 Term—the last year of the Warren Court—“the
government prevailed in only twenty-three percent of the constitu36
tional decisions.”
Nor was this judicial deference a one-year phenomenon. A year
later, for example, the Supreme Court, in Employment Division v. Smith,
tremendously limited the scope of the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment and provided for great judicial deference to gov37
ernment actions burdening religion.
The second phase of the
38
Rehnquist Court was from 1992 through about 2002. This era was
marked by a dramatic lack of deference to Congress and the states.
Former Solicitor General Seth P. Waxman observed that
[d]uring the entire first 200 years following ratification of the Constitution, only 127 federal laws were struck down—even accounting for the
many laws that fell victim to the New Deal’s head-on collision with the
Supreme Court in the tumultuous 1930s.
These days, however, the extraordinary act of one branch of government declaring that the other two branches have violated the Constitution has become almost commonplace. Since 1995, the Court has in39
validated twenty-six different federal enactments . . . .

34

Id. at 57-58 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 58.
36
Id.
37
494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause is not violated
by neutral laws of general applicability); see also infra notes 113-14 and accompanying
text (discussing the Court’s unprecedented restriction of the Free Exercise Clause in
Smith).
38
In this way, I am disagreeing with Professor Merrill, who puts the second phase
of the Court as beginning in 1994, characterized by an emphasis on federalism and a
deemphasis on social issues. Merrill, supra note 20, at 570. I choose 1992 because that
was the first year in which the Rehnquist Court, in New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 149, 161-66 (1992), invalidated a federal law on federalism grounds.
39
Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 1074 (2001) (internal
citations omitted).
35
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The Court’s lack of deference to Congress was most evident in the
federalism decisions, where the Court invalidated laws as exceeding
40
the scope of the Commerce Clause, narrowed the scope of Con41
gress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, re42
vived the Tenth Amendment as a constraint on federal power, and
expanded the scope of sovereign immunity to limit the enforcement
43
of federal statutes.
Nor was the Rehnquist Court during this time one that deferred
to state legislatures; as Professor Merrill has noted, the Court fre44
quently found state laws preempted by federal law during this time.
One would imagine that a Court committed to states’ rights would
45
narrow the preemptive scope of federal law, but this was not the case

40

See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000) (invalidating the
civil damages provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 as exceeding the
scope of Congress’s commerce power); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551
(1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 on the grounds that it
“neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the possession
[of a firearm in a manner prohibited by the Act] be connected in any way to interstate
commerce”).
41
See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993).
42
See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (invalidating a provision of federal law requiring that state and local law enforcement perform background
checks before issuing permits for firearms); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 149,
161-66 (invalidating a key provision of the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985 as impermissibly commandeering the states and violating the
Tenth Amendment).
43
See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment protects state governments from suit for alleged violations of Title I
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S.
62, 67 (2000) (holding that state governments could not be sued for violating the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967).
44
Merrill, supra note 20, at 571 (commenting upon “the continued willingness of
the Court to find state laws preempted by federal regulation”); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L.
REV. 1313, 1314 (2004) (describing Rehnquist Court decisions finding preemption).
45
As Professor Merrill observes,
A true believer in states’ rights presumably would want to see greater power
devolve from the federal government to the states. Such a sincere federalist
would not only support formal limits on congressional power and immunities
for states from suits by private citizens grounded in federal law, but he or she
would also want to interpret the preemptive effect of federal statutes narrowly,
so as to leave as large an ambit of state regulatory authority as possible.
Merrill, supra note 20, at 611; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 44, at 1313 (“One would
expect that a Court concerned with federalism and states’ rights also would be narrowing the scope of federal preemption of state laws.”).
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46

for the Rehnquist Court. Also, the Court invalidated many state laws
as violating the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of speech
47
and association.
Indeed, in cases striking down restrictions on
speech by judicial candidates and ruling in favor of the Boy Scouts’
ability to exclude gays despite a state law prohibiting such discrimination, the Court was split five to four with the five most conservative
48
Justices ruling against the state law. Nor after Bush v. Gore can it be
credibly claimed that the five most conservative Justices always showed
deference to state courts.
But in the last few years of its existence, the Rehnquist Court was
decidedly more moderate. There was a third distinct phase of the
Rehnquist Court, from 2002 through June 2005. In 2003, for exam49
ple, the Court upheld a law school’s affirmative action plan and invalidated a state law prohibiting private consensual homosexual activ50
Every federalism case in the last few years of the Rehnquist
ity.
Court was resolved in favor of federal power and against states’
51
rights. The last year of the Rehnquist Court—October Term 2004—
continued this pattern. Many of the most significant cases were re46

See Merrill, supra note 20, at 611-12 (noting the paradoxical support for preemption by Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas).
47
See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (invalidating a state law prohibiting judicial candidates from expressing views about disputed
legal or political issues as a violation of the First Amendment); Boy Scouts of America
v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (invalidating the application of a state public accommodation law compelling the Boy Scouts to accept a homosexual as a scout leader
on the grounds that the law violated First Amendment association rights).
48
531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (holding that the Florida Supreme Court’s demand of a
statewide recount of voter ballots would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
49
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (“[T]he Equal Protection
Clause does not prohibit the Law School’s narrowly tailored use of race in admissions
decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that
flow from a diverse student body.”). But see Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 249-51
(2003) (striking down the University of Michigan’s undergraduate affirmative action
program as violating the Equal Protection Clause).
50
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The Texas statute furthers no
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life
of the individual.”).
51
See, e.g., Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 602 (2004) (upholding federal legislation “proscribing bribery of state, local, and tribal officials of entities that receive at
least $10,000 in federal funds, [as] a valid exercise of congressional authority under
Article I of the Constitution”); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004) (upholding Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 as a constitutional use of
Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724-25 (2003) (permitting a private right of action for
Nevada state employees under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993).
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solved in a way that progressives, not conservatives, would prefer. For
example, the Court invalidated the death penalty for crimes commit52
ted by juveniles, refused to provide more protection for property
53
owners, and expanded the protections of federal civil rights stat54
utes.
I do not want to overstate the significance of this phenomenon or
to portray the Rehnquist Court as being overly liberal in its last few
years. There certainly have been many instances, especially in the
area of criminal justice, where the Rehnquist Court has ruled as one
would predict a conservative Court to act. In 2003, the Court upheld
55
life sentences for shoplifters under California’s three strikes law. In
October Terms 2003 and 2004 there were ten Fourth Amendment
cases, of which nine were decided in favor of law enforcement and
56
against criminal defendants.

52

See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005) (barring the death penalty
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for those under eighteen years of age
at the time of the commission of their crimes).
53
See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2666 (2005) (holding that a
private corporation’s use of the government’s eminent domain power can fulfill “public use” within the meaning of the Takings Clause); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544
U.S. 528, 531-32 (2005) (holding that a government regulation need not be shown to
“substantially advance legitimate state interests” in order to avoid being a taking).
54
See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005) (allowing disparate impact
employment discrimination claims to be brought under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171
(2005) (holding that claims of retaliation for sex discrimination complaints are actionable under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972).
55
See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003) (“[I]t was not an unreasonable
application of our clearly established law for [a state court] to affirm [the defendant’s]
sentence of two consecutive terms of 25 years to life in prison.”); Ewing v. California,
538 U.S. 11, 30 (2003) (holding that defendant’s “sentence of 25 years to life in person
. . . is not grossly disproportionate and therefore does not violate the Eighth Amendment[]”).
56
See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 95-96 (2005) (holding that the police
may detain and question a person who is not suspected of any crime, but happens to
be in the house of someone else that is being searched, and holding that additional
questioning beyond the scope of the search does not violate the Fourth Amendment);
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407-08 (2005) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
does not require “reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detection
dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop”); Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S.
146, 152-56 (2004) (holding that a warrantless arrest is valid so long as there was probable cause at the time of the arrest, regardless of whether the offense was “closely related” to the offense the arresting officer identified as the reason for arrest). The only
exception in the last two years was Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 551 (2004), which
held that a warrant must specify with particularity that which is to be searched or
seized.
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Overall, then, in assessing the Rehnquist Court, Professor Merrill
is correct in separating its differing phases. I, however, disagree with
his description. In assessing the substantive success of William
Rehnquist as a Chief Justice, an obvious conclusion emerges:
Rehnquist was far more successful in the first two phases, from 1986 to
2002, than in the last phase. Both in his Court’s initial deferential
phase and in its subsequent more activist phase, Rehnquist was consistently in the majority in all of the areas described above. In fact, in
every single case cited above from 1986 to 2002, Rehnquist was in the
majority and wrote most of the majority opinions. But from 2002 to
2005, Rehnquist was hardly in the majority at all in any of the deci57
sions coming to the more progressive results mentioned above.
Of course, it is tempting to speculate as to why the shift in the
Rehnquist Court occurred, especially as to the change in its last few
years. After giving this great reflection, I do not have a persuasive answer. Ultimately, the answer may be a straightforward one: in the last
few years of the Rehnquist Court, the more moderate group of Justices (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) were more successful in
many key cases at getting either O’Connor or Kennedy than the most
conservative Justices (Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas) were at getting
both. This is an accurate account of the decisions, but it still does not
explain why O’Connor and Kennedy were more likely to vote with the
moderate group in the last few years than they were to do so prior to
then.
II. THE THEMES OF THE REHNQUIST COURT
The prior section offered one way of looking at assessing the success of Chief Justice Rehnquist: temporally, by focusing on specific
time periods. Another way of examining and assessing Rehnquist’s
tenure as Chief Justice is more thematic, looking at the specific doctrinal themes of the Rehnquist Court and considering the extent to
which each reflects Rehnquist’s views.
Although any examination is inherently incomplete, I identify six
major themes of the Rehnquist Court and suggest that all very much
reflect the views of its Chief Justice:
(1) No new suspect classifications were found, and remedies for consti-

57

The only exception where Rehnquist was in the majority for what would be regarded as a progressive result was Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538
U.S. 721, 725 (2003), which permitted a private right of action to Nevada state employees under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993.
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tutional violations were limited.
(2) No new fundamental rights were recognized during the Rehnquist
Court, and many already existing rights were narrowed.
(3) The protections accorded criminal defendants were significantly
narrowed.
(4) The limits imposed on the government by the Establishment Clause
were relaxed.
(5) Access to federal courts to hear civil rights claims was significantly
limited.
(6) The powers of Congress were restricted for the first time in almost
sixty years: new limits were imposed on Congress’s commerce power
and authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Tenth
Amendment was revived as a constraint on federal power, and state sovereign immunity was significantly expanded.

I list these together at the outset because this is a place where the
whole is more than the sum of the parts; taken together, these themes
58
show a Court that, overall, moved the law significantly to the right.
Taken together, the themes show a Court that, overall, reflected the
ideology and positions of its Chief Justice.
To explain, I will consider each of these six themes individually.
A. No New Suspect Classifications Were Found, and Remedies for
Constitutional Violations Were Limited
At the inception of the Rehnquist Court in 1986, it was clearly established that strict scrutiny was used for discrimination based on race
59
and national origin, and also generally for discrimination against

58

This obviously does not reflect all of the areas of constitutional law. One obvious omission is freedom of speech under the First Amendment. Here, the record is
much more mixed as to whether the Rehnquist Court followed the views of the Chief
Justice. For example, although Rehnquist was a consistent advocate for empowering
the government to regulate sexual speech, sometimes he was in the majority in this
effort, but sometimes in dissent. Compare City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 283
(2000) (upholding regulations of sexual speech with Rehnquist in the majority), Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 546-47 (1993) (same), and Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 563 (1991) (same), with Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 673
(2004) (limiting federal laws regulating sexual speech on First Amendment grounds
with Rehnquist dissenting), and Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 258
(2002) (same).
59
Ironically, the first case to label discrimination based on race or national origin
as “suspect” was Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217 (1944) (upholding the
evacuation of Japanese Americans from the West Coast during World War II).
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60

noncitizens. Intermediate scrutiny was used under equal protection
61
for gender discrimination and for discrimination against non-marital
62
children. All other types of discrimination received only rational basis review under equal protection.
This did not change at all in the nineteen years of the Rehnquist
Court. In fact, the only major case finding an equal protection violation outside of these areas—Romer v. Evans —expressly used rational
basis review in declaring unconstitutional discrimination based on
63
sexual orientation.
The most important victory by a plaintiff asserting an equal pro64
tection violation was Bush v. Gore, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist
was in the majority.
The Rehnquist Court consistently limited remedies for violations
of civil rights. This was evident in the area of school desegregation.
In Board of Education v. Dowell, the issue was whether a desegregation
order should continue when its end would mean a resegregation of
65
the public schools. Oklahoma schools had been segregated under a
66
state law mandating separation of the races. A federal court order
67
was successful in desegregating the Oklahoma City public schools.
Evidence proved that ending the desegregation order would result in
68
resegregation.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that once a
“unitary” school system had been achieved, a federal court’s desegre-

60

See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (using strict scrutiny to
invalidate a state law denying welfare benefits to noncitizens). But in some instances,
only rational basis review is used for discrimination against non-citizens, such as where
the alienage classification relates to self-government and the democratic process. See,
e.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296-300 (1978) (upholding a statute preventing
noncitizens from being police officers as meeting rational basis review).
61
See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (articulating intermediate
scrutiny as the test for gender discrimination).
62
See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 275-76 (1978) (applying intermediate scrutiny as the test for determining the rights of illegitimate children whose fathers died
intestate); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977) (same).
63
517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) (invalidating a state initiative that repealed all laws
protecting gays and lesbians from discrimination and precluded the enactment of new
antidiscrimination laws).
64
531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam) (finding that Florida’s recount procedures in the 2000 presidential election violated the fundamental right to vote).
65
498 U.S. 237, 248-50 (1991).
66
Id. at 240.
67
Id. at 241-42.
68
Id. at 242.
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gation order should end even if it would mean resegregation of the
69
schools.
The Court did not define “unitary system” with any specificity. It
simply said that the desegregation decree should be ended if the
board “ha[s] complied in good faith” and “the vestiges of past dis70
crimination ha[ve] been eliminated to the extent practicable.” The
Court said that in evaluating this, “the District Court should look not
only at student assignments, but to every facet of school operations—
71
faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities.”
In Freeman v. Pitts, the Supreme Court held that a federal court
desegregation order should end when it is complied with, even if
other desegregation orders for the same school system remain in
72
place. A federal district court ordered desegregation of various aspects of a school system in Georgia that previously had been segre73
gated by law.
Part of the desegregation plan had been met; the
school system had achieved desegregation in pupil assignment and in
74
facilities. Another aspect of the desegregation order, concerning as75
signment of teachers, had not yet been fulfilled. The Court said that
once a portion of a desegregation order is met, the federal court
should cease its efforts as to that part and remain involved only as to
76
those aspects of the plan that have not been achieved.
In 1995, in Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins II), the Court ordered an
77
end to a school desegregation order for Kansas City schools. Mis78
souri law once required the racial segregation of all public schools.
It was not until 1985 that a federal district court ordered the desegre79
gation of the Kansas City, Missouri, public schools.
The federal
court’s desegregation effort made a difference. In 1983, twenty-four

69

Id. at 248-50.
Id. at 249-50.
71
Id. at 250 (internal quotation marks omitted).
72
503 U.S. 467, 471 (1992).
73
Id.
74
Id. at 474.
75
Id. at 481.
76
Id. at 491.
77
515 U.S. 70, 102 (1995). Earlier in the life of the case, the Supreme Court had
ruled that a federal district court could order a local taxing body to increase taxes to
pay for compliance with a desegregation order, although the federal court should not
itself order an increase in the taxes. Missouri v. Jenkins ( Jenkins I ), 495 U.S. 33, 57-58
(1990).
78
Jenkins I, 495 U.S. at 37.
79
Id. at 37-38.
70

1346

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 154: 1331

schools in the district had an African American enrollment of 90% or
80
more. By 1993, no elementary-level student attended a school with
81
an enrollment that was 90% or more African American. At the middle school and high school levels, the percentage of students attending schools with an African American enrollment of 90% or more de82
clined from about 45% to 22%.
The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, ruled in favor of the state on every issue. The Court ruled that the continued
disparity in student test scores did not justify continuance of the fed83
eral court’s desegregation order.
The Court concluded that the
Constitution requires equal opportunity, not any particular result, and
that therefore disparities between African American and white students on standardized tests were not a sufficient basis for concluding
84
that desegregation had not been achieved. The Supreme Court held
that once a desegregation order is complied with in good faith, the
85
federal court effort should end. Disparity in test scores is not a basis
86
for continued federal court involvement.
These Rehnquist Court decisions have led to a large number of
87
lower court cases ending desegregation orders. The result has been
the substantial resegregation of American public schools.
Harvard Professor Gary Orfield has shown that, nationally, the
percentage of African American students attending majority black
schools and schools where over 90% of the students are black also has

80

Jenkins II, 515 U.S. at 115 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Jenkins v. Missouri, 959 F. Supp. 1151, 1165 (W.D. Mo. 1997).
82
Id.
83
Jenkins II, 515 U.S. at 101.
84
Id. at 100-01.
85
Id. at 89.
86
Id. at 101.
87
See, e.g., Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 335 (4th Cir.
2001) (en banc) (ending the desegregation order for the Charlotte-Mecklenberg
schools); NAACP v. Duval County Sch., 273 F.3d 960, 962 (11th Cir. 2001) (ending the
desegregation order for the Tampa schools); Berry v. Sch. Dist., 195 F. Supp. 2d 971,
999–1001 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (ending the desegregation efforts for the Benton Harbor
public schools); Lee v. Butler County Bd. of Educ., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1368–69
(M.D. Ala. 2002) (ending the desegregation order for the Butler County schools); Lee
v. Opelika City Bd. of Educ., No. 70-T-853-E, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2513, at *28–29
(M.D. Ala. Feb. 13, 2002) (ending the desegregation order for the Opelika schools);
Davis v. Sch. Dist., 95 F. Supp. 2d 688, 698 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (ending desegregation
order for the Pontiac public schools).
81
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88

increased in the last fifteen years. In 1986-1987, 63.3% of black students attended schools that were comprised of 50% to 100% minority
89
students; by 1998-1999, this composition had increased to 70.2%.
In North Carolina, for example, the same pattern exists. Between
1993 and 2000, the number of black students attending schools with
90
minority enrollments of 80% or more doubled. In Charlotte, fewer
than 60% of the schools meet the standard definition of “diverse”; this
91
is down from 85% in the 1980s.
A second way in which the Rehnquist Court has limited remedies
for discrimination is by restricting affirmative action. The Rehnquist
Court will be most remembered for its one decision upholding af92
firmative action: Grutter v. Bollinger. Although this is an enormously
important ruling, it must be remembered that this was the only
Rehnquist Court decision upholding affirmative action. When
Rehnquist became Chief Justice, the level of scrutiny to be used for
93
racial classifications benefiting minorities was uncertain.
But the
Rehnquist Court decisively adopted strict scrutiny review for affirmative action programs, concluding that benign racial classifications
benefiting minorities should be treated in the same way as invidious
94
ones disadvantaging racial minorities.
The Court repeatedly held
that strict scrutiny review would be applied when the government used
95
race as a factor in drawing election districts to benefit minorities.

88

GARY ORFIELD, SCHOOLS MORE SEPARATE: CONSEQUENCES OF A DECADE OF
SEGREGATION 32 (Harv. Univ. Civil Rights Project, 2001), available

REat
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Schools_More_Separate.pdf.
89
Id. at 31.
90
Tim Simmons & Susan Ebbs, Separate and Unequal, Again, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 18, 2001, at A1.
91
Id.
92
539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (holding that the University of Michigan Law School’s
race-conscious admissions program did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
93
See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491-92 (1980) (upholding affirmative action program without adopting a level of scrutiny).
94
See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (adopting
strict scrutiny for benign classifications); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 506-07 (1989) (requiring a compelling interest and narrow tailoring for benign
racial classifications).
95
See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920-21 (1995) (analyzing the creation
of a majority black election district using strict scrutiny); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,
653 (1993) (using strict scrutiny to analyze racial gerrymandering allegations). The
Court, however, did hold that race could be used if the reason was political, such as in
allocating individuals likely to vote for Democrats. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234,
258 (2001).
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Finally, it should be noted that the Rehnquist Court also consistently interpreted civil rights statutes narrowly. For example, in 1989,
a series of Supreme Court decisions very narrowly interpreting federal
civil rights statutes prompted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which over96
ruled these decisions by revising the federal civil rights laws.
In
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, the Court made it much more difficult for a plaintiff to recover in an employment discrimination case by
97
requiring that the plaintiff prove a racially disparate impact. In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, the Court held that the federal prohibition of race discrimination in contracting, found in 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
applies only to the formation of contracts, and that racial harassment
98
after hiring is not actionable under that law.
I doubt anyone would challenge that the Court’s approach to civil
rights in the constitutional and statutory areas reflected the views of
Chief Justice Rehnquist. He was in the majority in every one of the
cases mentioned. From the time he was nominated to the Supreme
Court, there was concern over his views concerning civil rights, especially because of a memorandum he wrote as a law clerk to Justice
99
Robert Jackson urging the affirmance of Plessy v. Ferguson.
The
Rehnquist Court succeeded in implementing the visions of its Chief in
the area of equal protection and civil rights.
B. No New Fundamental Rights Were Recognized During the Rehnquist
Court, and Many Already Existing Rights Were Narrowed
With regard to individual rights, the Rehnquist Court always will
100
be remembered most for not overruling Roe v. Wade. Rehnquist dissented in Roe, along with Justice Byron White, and afterwards consis101
The Rehnquist Court lesstently urged that the Court overrule Roe.
ened constitutional protection for abortion rights by replacing strict
96

Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
490 U.S. 642, 648 (1989) (noting that employment claims are treated as disparate impact cases).
98
491 U.S. 164, 176 (1989) (noting that the relief available under § 1981 is limited
to making and enforcing contracts and does not address problems after hiring); see also
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)-(b) (2000) (requiring that all persons have equal rights to “make
and enforce contracts”).
99
This memo is discussed in detail in KLUGER, supra note 6, at 609-15.
100
410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“[The] right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”).
101
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 944 (1992)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“We believe that Roe was wrongly decided, and that it can and should be overruled . . . .”).
97
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scrutiny with the “undue burden” test to evaluate the constitutionality
102
of government regulation of previability abortions.
But this action
obviously did not go nearly as far as Rehnquist would have liked, and
103
Rehnquist consistently dissented in cases protecting abortion rights.
Overall, though, Rehnquist’s views with regard to individual rights
largely prevailed during his time as Chief Justice. Most notably, not
once did the Rehnquist Court recognize any new fundamental rights.
The list of fundamental rights under the Constitution—claims of liberties that trigger strict scrutiny—is exactly the same in 2006 as it was
in 1986 when Rehnquist became Chief.
There were only two instances in which the Rehnquist Court recognized new rights, and strikingly in each the Court did not use the
language of fundamental rights or apply strict scrutiny. In Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Court held that competent
adults have the right to refuse medical treatment, that a state may require clear and convincing evidence that a person wanted the treatment to end, and that a state may prevent family members from ter104
minating treatment for another. Rehnquist wrote the opinion for
the Court and though it assumed a right to refuse medical care, it
clearly did not find a fundamental right or use strict scrutiny. This
105
was especially clear when, in Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v.
106
Quill, the Supreme Court held that there is not a constitutional
right to physician-assisted suicide. Rehnquist wrote the Court’s opinions in both of these cases.
The other instance in which the Rehnquist Court recognized a
new right was Lawrence v. Texas, which held that states may not crimi107
nally prohibit private, consensual same-sex sexual activity.
Over
108
Rehnquist’s dissenting vote, the Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick.
Although Lawrence is an enormously important decision protecting
individual rights, it is significant that Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion did not use the language of fundamental rights or strict scrutiny.

102

Id. at 878 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.).
See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 922 (2000) (invalidating, over
Rehnquist’s dissent, a state law prohibiting certain abortion procedures).
104
497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990).
105
521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997).
106
521 U.S. 793, 808-09 (1997).
107
539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
108
478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that the Constitution does not protect private, consensual homosexual activity).
103
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As a result, lower courts have read the case as endorsing only rational
109
basis review.
In many other areas, the Rehnquist Court significantly constricted
individual rights compared to what they had been when Rehnquist
became Chief in 1986. Rehnquist was in the majority in all of these
areas. For example, in 1989, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Supreme
110
Court significantly limited the rights of unmarried fathers.
The Supreme Court held that even an unmarried father who participates actively in the child’s life is not entitled to due process if the mother is
111
married to someone else.
Specifically, the Supreme Court ruled
that a state may create an irrebuttable presumption that a married
woman’s husband is the father of her child even though it negates all
112
of the biological father’s rights.
Rehnquist joined Justice Scalia’s
majority opinion.
Another particularly important example of the narrowing of constitutional protections was Employment Division v. Smith, which greatly
limited the protections of the Free Exercise Clause of the First
113
Amendment.
Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Scalia’s majority opinion holding that the Free Exercise Clause is not violated by a
neutral law of general applicability, no matter how much the law bur114
dens religion.
Never before had the Court articulated this restrictive view of the Constitution’s protections for free exercise of religion.
Thus, the overall record of the Rehnquist Court in following the
views of the Chief Justice was more mixed with regard to fundamental
rights than with regard to equal protection. No new fundamental
rights were recognized and some existing rights were narrowed, but
the Court did not go as far in this direction as Rehnquist urged.

109

See, e.g., Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004)
(“[W]e decline to extrapolate from Lawrence and its dicta a right to sexual privacy triggering strict scrutiny.”).
110
491 U.S. 110, 129 (1989) (“[T]he absence of a legal tie with the mother may in
such circumstances appropriately place a limit on whatever substantive constitutional
claims may otherwise exist.” (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979)
(Stewart, J., dissenting))).
111
Id.
112
Id. at 129-30.
113
494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990).
114
Id. at 882.
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C. The Protections Accorded Criminal Defendants
Were Significantly Narrowed
Another consistent feature of the Rehnquist Court has been its
strong likelihood of ruling in favor of the government in criminal
procedure cases. Generally, criminal defendants have lost before the
Rehnquist Court in all three of its phases. Rehnquist has been in the
majority in all of these efforts.
For example, the Court constantly has sought to narrow the availability of habeas corpus for prisoners. In 1989, in Teague v. Lane, the
Court imposed a significant new limit on the availability of relief under habeas corpus: habeas petitions could be heard only if they relied
on already existing constitutional principles, and “new rules” could be
raised on habeas corpus only in the rare circumstances that they
115
would apply retroactively.
In McCleskey v. Zant, the Court ruled that
successive habeas petitions were not allowed unless the petitioner
116
could demonstrate either cause and prejudice or actual innocence.
In 1996, Congress greatly restricted the availability of habeas cor117
pus in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
Since then, the Supreme Court has interpreted the statute expansively
to limit habeas corpus. For example, in Tyler v. Cain, the Court held
that a habeas petition cannot be heard, even if a person was clearly
unconstitutionally convicted, unless the Supreme Court holds that its
118
prior decision applies retroactively.
The Fourth Amendment is another area in which criminal defendants have lost throughout the Rehnquist Court. In 1989, for in119
stance, the Court upheld drug-courier profiling
and ground
120
searches by airplanes flying within permissible limits.
In the early
1990s, the Court upheld the constitutionality of arresting a person for
121
a traffic violation that carries no possibility of a prison sentence,
115

489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989).
499 U.S. 467, 493-94 (1991).
117
Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101-08, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217-26 (amending certain habeas corpus procedures).
118
533 U.S. 656, 662 (2001).
119
See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (noting that the evidentiary
value of factors leading to a conclusion of reasonable suspicion is not lessened by their
inclusion in a “drug courier profile”).
120
See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989) (holding that, since the police
helicopter was legally flying in public airspace when the defendant’s property was observed, his Fourth Amendment rights were not violated).
121
See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (addressing the constitutionality of arrests for minor crimes).
116
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122

stops of motorists based on only innocuous factors, and searches of
123
bus passengers without meaningful consent.
These, of course, are
only a few examples of Fourth Amendment rulings. In the last three
years of the Rehnquist Court, there were fourteen Fourth Amend124
ment cases, and the police won in thirteen of them.
But especially in the last few years of the Rehnquist Court, there
were some notable triumphs by criminal defendants. In Dickerson v.
125
United States, the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
126
reaffirmed Miranda v. Arizona.
Perhaps most dramatically, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court protected the right to trial by jury by holding that any factor, other than a
prior conviction, that leads to a sentence greater than the statutory
127
maximum must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury.
Apprendi has brought about an enormous amount of litigation and
unquestionably is one of the most important developments during the
Rehnquist years. Rehnquist was in the dissent in Apprendi and Blakely
128
129
v. Washington, though in the majority in United States v. Booker’s
conclusion that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are constitutional
so long as they are advisory and not mandatory.

122

See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (upholding a traffic stop
based on the border patrol agent’s “observations, his registration check, and his experience”).
123
See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 203-04 (2002) (declining to hold the
search in question an illegal seizure).
124
The Fourth Amendment cases from Rehnquist’s last Term all were won by law
enforcement. See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100-01 (2005) (holding that the officer’s detainment of the defendant was reasonable in spite of the lack of independent
reasonable suspicion about the defendant’s immigration status); Illinois v. Caballes,
543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (characterizing the police conduct in question as not infringing the defendant’s Fourth Amendment Rights); Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146,
153-54 (2004) (upholding an arrest as supported by probable cause, even though the
offense was not closely related to the reasons stated for the arrest). The only exception
in the last two years was Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563 (2004) (requiring that the
warrant must specify with particularity that which is to be searched or seized).
125
530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
126
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
127
530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000).
128
542 U.S. 297, 301 (2004) (applying the Apprendi rule that any factor, other than
a prior conviction, that provides for a penalty greater than that which could be imposed based on the jury’s verdict or what the defendant admitted, must be proven to
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt).
129
543 U.S. 220, 233-34, 260-63 (2005) (applying the principles of Apprendi and
Blakely to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, requiring the guidelines to be advisory,
not mandatory, and holding that appellate review should be to determine whether a
sentence is unreasonable).
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There were other notable victories for criminal defendants, particularly during the third phase of the Rehnquist Court. In Crawford v.
Washington, the Court changed the law, overruled precedent, and provided more protections under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment by limiting hearsay testimony that could be used against
130
criminal defendants.
In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court in131
validated the death penalty for the mentally retarded.
In a six-tothree decision, with Justice Stevens writing for the Court and
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas dissenting, the Court reaffirmed that
“evolving standards of decency” are to be used to determine what is
132
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
The
Court looked to the trend among the states as well as international
133
practice in determining “evolving standards of decency.” The Court
pointed to the number of states that have eliminated the death penalty for crimes committed by the mentally retarded and how few for134
eign countries permit the practice.
Quite importantly, the Court
stressed that there is a significant risk of executing innocent individuals because those with mental disabilities are more likely to make false
135
confessions and are less likely to be able to work with counsel.
In Roper v. Simmons, the Court ruled that it was cruel and unusual
punishment to impose the death penalty for crimes committed by ju136
veniles. In the five-to-four decision, Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court, which was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Gins137
Once more, the Court rested its decision on the
burg, and Breyer.
premise that “evolving standards of decency” are to be used to determine what is cruel and unusual punishment. The Court explained:
“To implement this framework we have established the propriety and
affirmed the necessity of referring to ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’ to determine
which punishments are so disproportionate as to be cruel and un-

130

541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (overruling Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), and
holding that using out-of-court, testimonial statements without providing the criminal
defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the witness violates the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment).
131
536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
132
Id. at 311-12 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
133
Id. at 314-17.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 320-21.
136
543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
137
Id. at 554.
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138

usual.” As in Atkins, the Court again looked to the trend among the
states and international practice in determining “evolving standards of
139
decency.”
Overall though, surely no one would disagree that the Rehnquist
Court, throughout its existence, overwhelmingly has sided with the
government and ruled against criminal defendants in criminal procedure cases. This is an area where the Supreme Court was generally
quite in accord with the views of its Chief Justice.
D. The Limits Imposed on the Government by the
Establishment Clause Were Relaxed
In important ways, this is an area where Chief Justice Rehnquist
did not succeed; the Rehnquist Court did not go nearly as far as
Rehnquist would have liked in changing the law regarding the Establishment Clause. Although Rehnquist clearly favored overruling the
test for the Establishment Clause articulated by the Supreme Court in
140
141
Lemon v. Kurtzman, there never were five votes in favor of this view.
Rehnquist’s position—that the Establishment Clause is violated only if
the government establishes a church, coerces religious participation,
142
or favors some religions over others —never was adopted by a majority of the Court. To be more specific, Rehnquist consistently dis143
sented in cases limiting prayers in public schools.
But the Rehnquist Court did follow Rehnquist’s views of the Establishment Clause in one key area: the Court allowed significantly more

138

Id. at 560-61 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101).
Id. at 563-65, 575-78.
140
403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (explaining that the government violates the Establishment Clause if it acts with the purpose of advancing religion, or if the primary effect of its act is to advance or inhibit religion, or if there is excessive government entanglement with religion).
141
See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2748 (2005) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (describing the view of four Justices, including Rehnquist, that the majority’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause is incorrect); Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577, 631 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (demonstrating that four Justices, including Rehnquist, urged changes in the law of the Establishment Clause).
142
For an articulation of this view set out in a concurring opinion that Rehnquist
joined, see County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 656-58 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
143
See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315-16 (2000) (deciding that student-delivered prayers at high school football games violate the Establishment Clause); Lee, 505 U.S. at 599 (holding that prayers delivered by members of the
clergy at public school graduations over student objection violate the Establishment
Clause).
139
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government aid to religious schools. In 1997, in Agostini v. Felton, the
Court reversed a decade-old precedent and held that public school
special education teachers may provide services in parochial
144
schools.
In Mitchell v. Helms, decided in June 2000, the Court reversed two
precedents and allowed the government to lend instructional equip145
ment to parochial schools.
Two years later, in Zelman v. SimmonsHarris, the Court upheld a voucher program for the Cleveland schools
146
even though 96% of the vouchers went to parochial schools.
In an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court, five to four, concluded
that this did not violate the Establishment Clause because all schools,
including all religious schools, could receive money and because the
government was acting with the permissible purpose of improving
147
education for children.
Thus, with respect to the Establishment Clause, Rehnquist’s success was more mixed. This, however, may be an area where
Rehnquist’s vision ultimately will triumph. If the two new Justices—
John Roberts and Samuel Alito—take the Rehnquist approach, there
will be five votes to overrule the Lemon test and bring about the dramatic change long sought by Rehnquist.
E. Access to Federal Courts to Hear Civil Rights Claims
Was Significantly Limited
One of the most overlooked consequences of the Rehnquist
Court’s jurisprudence has been a significant restriction of access to
the courthouse. In a series of cases interpreting federal civil rights
statutes, the Court consistently has limited the ability of civil rights
plaintiffs to sue. In every one of these cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist
was in the majority and almost all were decided five to four.
For example, in Alexander v. Sandoval, the Court held, five to four,
that there is no private right of action to enforce regulations promul148
gated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Title VI prevents recipients of federal money from discriminating based on race
144

521 U.S. 203, 234-35 (1997) (overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402
(1985)).
145
530 U.S. 793, 835 (2000) (overruling, to the extent they conflict with the
Mitchell holding, Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), and Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229 (1977)).
146
536 U.S. 639, 644, 647 (2002).
147
Id. at 649, 653.
148
532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001).
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and from engaging in practices that have a racially discriminatory im149
pact.
The importance of these regulations cannot be overstated.
The Supreme Court has held that violations of the Equal Protection
Clause and equal protection components of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment require proof of discriminatory purpose, which
150
may be difficult to show. Therefore, Title VI regulations are the key
method of challenging actions that disadvantage racial minorities
when discriminatory purpose cannot be proven. Since it is so difficult
to prove discriminatory intent, Title VI has been an enormously im151
portant weapon in civil rights litigation.
But the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Alexander that no lawsuits can be brought under these regulations means that civil rights plaintiffs have lost a key weapon for
challenging practices that have a racially discriminatory impact.
Notably, the Court, in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, did not invalidate the Title VI regulations. The Court did say, however, that
their validity was an open question to be considered on another occa152
sion.
Instead, the Court assumed the validity of the regulations and
ruled that no lawsuits can be brought to enforce them. How, then,
are the Title VI regulations to be enforced? They only can be enforced if the political branches of government are willing to cut off
funds to recipients who engage in practices with a racially disparate
impact. Once more, the Court has denied access to the judiciary and
left enforcement of civil rights to the political branches of government.
Another example of the Court’s restriction of access to the judiciary is the imposition of limits on the use of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce other federal civil rights laws. Some federal civil rights laws, like
other federal statutes, do not authorize a private right of action. Section 1983 is the crucial vehicle for enforcement of these laws in
153
courts. But in Gonzaga University v. Doe, the Court held that the provisions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act that restrict
educational institutions from releasing information about their students cannot be enforced through a private right of action as a § 1983
149

See id. at 279-81 (describing aspects of Title VI that “must be taken as given”).
See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (holding that disproportionate impact alone is not enough to invalidate a statute).
151
See, e.g., S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771,
774 (3d Cir. 2001) (considering a disparate impact claim under Title VI in an environmental racism case).
152
Alexander, 532 U.S. at 279.
153
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (providing for the liability of anyone who, under
color of law, deprives another of her constitutional rights).
150
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154

suit.
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion held that since the
law was adopted by Congress under its spending power and did not
unambiguously confer individual rights, it could not be enforced
155
through litigation.
As in Alexander, compliance will depend on the
willingness of the political branches to enforce the law’s requirements
by cutting off funds to offending institutions. The unquestionable
value of litigation in deterring violations and providing a remedy to
victims was never recognized by the Court.
Yet another example of the closing of the courthouse doors has
been the aggressive enforcement of arbitration clauses. There has
been an important trend in recent years towards businesses insisting
on arbitration clauses in contracts. This is common in many areas,
such as employment and health care. Frequently, these clauses are
written in broad terms and leave the other party to the contract no alternative but to forego access to the courts.
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams involved an employee of a Circuit
City store in California who sued the company in state court under
156
state antidiscrimination laws.
His employment application included
157
a clause providing for arbitration of employment-related disputes.
Circuit City filed a lawsuit in federal district court, pursuant to the
158
159
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) of 1925, to compel arbitration.
The FAA has an exception for maritime and other employment con160
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court, in
tracts in interstate commerce.
a five-to-four decision, ruled that the state law discrimination claims
161
had to go to arbitration and could not be litigated in court.
The
Court broadly construed the FAA and narrowly interpreted its excep162
tion to apply only to “employment of transportation workers.”
The
Court did not discuss, or even acknowledge, the compelling public
purpose of allowing victims of discrimination to have access to the
163
courts.
154

536 U.S. 273, 276 (2002).
Id. at 279.
156
532 U.S. 105, 110 (2001).
157
Id. at 109-10.
158
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000).
159
532 U.S. at 110.
160
9 U.S.C. § 1.
161
532 U.S. at 124.
162
Id. at 119.
163
It should be noted, though, that in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.
Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 285 (2002), the Court held that an arbitration clause
does not preclude the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) from
155
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The above techniques of closing the courthouse door have involved the Supreme Court directly precluding all access by civil rights
plaintiffs. The Court also ruled against civil rights plaintiffs by eliminating incentives to litigate and creating obstacles which are disincentives to suits.
The Supreme Court’s important ruling in Buckhannon Board &
Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources,
provides an example of the former approach, where the Court made
it much more difficult for successful plaintiffs to recover attorneys’
164
fees. The availability of attorneys’ fees under civil rights statutes is a
major incentive for suits. The reality is that without this incentive, it
would be far more difficult to enforce civil rights laws. Buckhannon involved a challenge to state regulations under several federal statutes,
including the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and the Ameri165
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990.
There was protracted litigation
and ultimately the state voluntarily changed its policy and adopted
166
what the plaintiffs had been seeking through their suit.
The plaintiffs then sought attorneys’ fees on the grounds that they had been the
catalyst for the changes. The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, rejected their position and held that a plaintiff is not deemed to
“prevail” just because her lawsuit is the “catalyst” for the government
167
to change its policy.
Attorneys’ fees are to be awarded only when
there is a judicial action—a judgment or consent decree—in favor of
168
the plaintiff.
The result is that a defendant can preclude a deserving plaintiff
from recovering attorneys’ fees simply by changing policies before a
verdict. Reducing the chances of attorneys’ fees in this way will often
remove a crucial incentive to litigate and effectively close the courthouse door in many civil rights cases.

bringing a discrimination claim on behalf of an individual. The Court explained that
an individual, via an arbitration clause, waives her right to sue, but the person cannot
waive the government’s authority to bring an enforcement action. Id. at 286-88. This
is a significant ruling, but it does relatively little to undercut the effect of Circuit City.
The EEOC’s ability to sue on behalf of individuals is inherently limited by scarce resources. The vast majority of employees with arbitration clauses in their contracts will
not have any meaningful access to the courts when they are subjected to discrimination.
164
532 U.S. 598, 605-06 (2001).
165
Id. at 601.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 605-06.
168
Id. at 603.
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Cumulatively, these decisions make it much harder for civil rights
plaintiffs to be heard in federal court or to gain relief. Since
Rehnquist was in the majority of all of these cases and wrote several of
the opinions, there is no doubt that the Court was in accord with his
substantive vision.
F. The Powers of Congress Were Restricted for the First Time in Almost Sixty Years:
New Limits Were Imposed on Congress’s Commerce Power and
Its Authority Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Tenth Amendment Was Revived as a Constraint on Federal Power,
and There Was a Significant Expansion of State Sovereign Immunity
I have no doubt that when constitutional historians look back at
the Rehnquist Court, they will say that its greatest changes in constitutional law were in the area of federalism. Especially here, there is no
doubt that Rehnquist had a definite substantive vision, and the
Rehnquist Court, except in the last few years, acted in accordance with
his views.
In the first third of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court used
concern over states’ rights and federalism as the basis for limiting the
scope of Congress’s commerce power and also held that the Tenth
Amendment reserves a zone of activities for exclusive state control.
For example, in Hammer v. Dagenhart, the Court struck down a federal
law prohibiting child labor on the ground that it violated the Tenth
169
Amendment.
After 1937, however, the Court rejected this view and
no longer saw the Tenth Amendment as a limit on federal power; it
was just a reminder that Congress could not act unless there was ex170
press or implied constitutional authority.
In 1976, the Court appeared to revive federalism as a limit on
congressional powers in National League of Cities v. Usery, in which the
Court invalidated a federal law that required state and local govern171
ments to pay their employees a minimum wage.
The Court, in an
opinion by then-Justice Rehnquist, held that Congress could not regu172
late states in areas of “traditional” or “integral” state responsibility.
This was a dramatic decision, as it was the first instance of the Supreme Court striking a law down on federalism grounds in forty years.
169

241 U.S. 251, 274, 276-77 (1918) (“The grant of authority over a purely federal
matter was not intended to destroy the local power always reserved to the states in the
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution.”).
170
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 310-11 (2d ed. 2002).
171
426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
172
Id. at 851-52.
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Rehnquist’s strong support for states’ rights, especially as a limit
173
on federal power, was noted before he became Chief Justice.
Only
after he became Chief Justice, however, was Rehnquist’s vision realized. Nine years after National League of Cities was decided, it was expressly overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author174
ity.
Justice Rehnquist, in a short dissent, said that he believed that
175
his view would again triumph on the Court.
Subsequently, after he became Chief Justice, the Court endorsed
Rehnquist’s views and revived the Tenth Amendment as a constraint
on Congress’s authority. In New York v. United States, the Court—for
only the second time in fifty-five years and the first time since the
overruled National League of Cities decision—invalidated a federal law
176
as violating the Tenth Amendment.
A federal law, the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, created a statutory
duty for states to provide for the safe disposal of radioactive wastes
177
generated within their borders. In an opinion by Justice O’Connor,
the Court held that forcing states to accept ownership of radioactive
178
The
wastes would impermissibly “commandeer” state governments.
Court concluded that it was “clear” that because of the Tenth
Amendment, “[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States
179
to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.”
A few years later, in Printz v. United States, the Court applied and
180
extended New York v. United States. Printz involved a challenge to the
181
federal Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993.
The law
required that the “chief law enforcement officer” of each local jurisdiction conduct background checks before issuing permits for fire-

173

For an excellent description of Rehnquist’s federalism vision, written before
Rehnquist became Chief, see Jeff Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and
Federalism, 91 YALE L.J. 1317, 1363-70 (1982).
174
469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
175
Id. at 579-80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
176
505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
177
42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (1988) (requiring states to either “provide for the
disposal of all [radioactive] waste” created within their borders or take title to and accept possession of the waste).
178
505 U.S. at 188.
179
Id.
180
521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997).
181
18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994).
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arms.
The Court, in a five-to-four decision, found that the law vio183
lated the Tenth Amendment.
The Rehnquist Court revived federalism as a limit on Congress’s
powers in another way: It restricted the scope of Congress’s com184
merce power. In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court, with the
majority opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, declared unconstitutional the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, a federal
law that made it a crime to have a firearm within one thousand feet of
185
a school.
186
In United States v. Morrison, the Court followed Lopez and declared unconstitutional the civil damages provision of the Violence
187
Against Women Act of 1994.
The provision created a federal cause
of action for victims of gender-motivated violence. In enacting the
Violence Against Women Act, Congress held lengthy hearings and
found that gender-motivated violence cost the American economy bil188
lions of dollars a year.
Most importantly, Congress found that state
189
courts often insufficiently dealt with violence against women.
But
the Supreme Court nonetheless invalidated the law in an opinion by
190
Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Rehnquist also was instrumental in advancing states’ rights
through the expansion of the scope of state sovereign immunity. In
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, a 1996 opinion written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the Court held that Congress may authorize suits against
states only pursuant to laws enacted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which empowers Congress to adopt statutes to
191
enforce that Amendment.
Based on this finding, in Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, the Court,
again in opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that state govern192
ments cannot be sued for patent infringement.
In Kimel v. Florida
Board of Regents, the Court decided that state governments may not be
sued for violating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192

Id. § 922(s)(2).
521 U.S. at 933.
514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994).
529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994).
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 632 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 619-20 (majority opinion).
Id. at 627.
517 U.S. 44, 65-66 (1996).
527 U.S. 627, 647-68 (1999).
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193

1967.
In Board of Trustees v. Garrett, the Court, in an opinion by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, ruled that state governments may not be sued
for employment discrimination in violation of Title I of the Americans
194
with Disabilities Act of 1990.
In each case, the Court, in a five-tofour decision, concluded that Congress was expanding the scope of
rights and that the laws could not be justified as narrowly tailored to
195
preventing or remedying constitutional violations.
The Court also expanded the situations in which sovereign immunity could be asserted. In another five-to-four decision, Alden v.
Maine, the Court held that sovereign immunity protects state governments from being sued in state court without their consent, even to
196
enforce federal laws.
At oral argument in Alden, Solicitor General
Seth Waxman quoted to the Court from the Supremacy Clause of Article VI and contended that suits against states are essential to assure
197
the supremacy of federal law.
Justice Kennedy’s response to this argument in the Alden opinion is enormously revealing of the Rehnquist
Court’s attitude towards federalism. He stated:
The constitutional privilege of a State to assert its sovereign immunity in
its own courts does not confer upon the State a concomitant right to disregard the Constitution or valid federal law. The States and their officers are bound by obligations imposed by the Constitution and by federal statutes that comport with the constitutional design. We are
unwilling to assume the States will refuse to honor the Constitution or
obey the binding laws of the United States. The good faith of the States
thus provides an important assurance that “[t]his Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . .
198
shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”

What, then, is the assurance that state governments will comply
with federal law? Trust in the good faith of state governments? Is it
possible to imagine that thirty or forty years ago, at the height of the
civil rights movement, the Supreme Court would have issued such a
statement that state governments simply could be trusted to voluntarily comply with federal law?

193

528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000).
531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).
195
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91; Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 646;
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73.
196
527 U.S. 706, 759-60 (1999).
197
Transcript of Oral Argument, Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (No. 98436), 1999 WL 216178 at *12.
198
527 U.S. at 754-55 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI).
194
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Interestingly, the most recent federalism decisions of the
Rehnquist Court were in favor of federal power. In Nevada Department
of Human Resources v. Hibbs, the Court allowed suits against states for
violations of the family leave provisions of the Family and Medical
199
Leave Act of 1993.
Chief Justice Rehnquist was in the majority in
the six-to-three decision. In Tennessee v. Lane, the Court held that
states may be sued pursuant to Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 for discriminating against people with disabilities with
200
regard to access to the courts.
Here, Rehnquist dissented in a fiveto-four decision. Finally, in his last Term, in Gonzales v. Raich, the
Court, over Rehnquist’s dissent, upheld the constitutionality of a federal law prohibiting cultivation and possession of small amounts of
201
marijuana for medicinal purposes.
Rehnquist wrote the opinion in
Hibbs, but dissented in Lane and Raich.
Overall, the Rehnquist Court’s federalism decisions are a dramatic
departure in the law from what it was before William Rehnquist became Chief Justice. In every case limiting federal power, Rehnquist
was in the majority, and in many he wrote the Court’s decision. The
only deviation was in the third phase of the Rehnquist Court described above. But there can be little dispute that federalism was one
of Rehnquist’s great triumphs in bringing his conservative vision to
constitutional doctrine.
CONCLUSION
There are many ways in which a Chief Justice can influence the
substantive decision making of the Court. The Chief plays a key role
in leading the conferences that determine which cases will be heard.
The Chief leads the discussions at conferences where the cases are decided. The Chief assigns the majority opinion when in the majority,
and this often can be important in keeping the majority. In all of
these ways, and others, a Chief can have a significant effect on the decisions. All of these forms of influence are invisible outside the Court,
except by looking at the results and the decisions themselves.
Yet, it is possible to assess the success of a Chief Justice by looking
at whether that individual’s views were followed by the Court. My
conclusion is that William Rehnquist was a tremendously successful
Chief Justice, especially in his first sixteen years as Chief, in having his
199
200
201

538 U.S. 721, 725 (2003).
541 U.S. 509, 533-54 (2004).
125 S. Ct. 2195, 2201 (2005).
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views accepted by a majority and reflected in the decisions of his
Court.

